Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Terrie Daybell v. Workforce Appeals Board, Utah
Department of Workforce Services : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blain H. Johnson; Johnson Law Firm; Attorney for Petitioner .
Suzan Pixton; Workforce Appeals Board; Attorney for Respondent .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Daybell v. Workforce, No. 20110073 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2749

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

TERRIE DAYBELL,
Petitioner/Appellant,

^ouoCT^v
vs.
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES
Defendant/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

BLAIN H. JOHNSON (7400)
Attorney for Appellant
Johnson Law Firm
2036 Lincoln Avenue. Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
SUSAN PIXTON (2608)
Attorney for Appellee
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
PO Box 45244
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244

A P P ^ECOURTS

UTAH

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DEC 0 1 * on

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND
ORDINANCES AT ISSUE

2

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I:

7

POINT II:

10

POINT III

11

POINT IV

12

CONCLUSION

17

MAILING CERTIFICATE

19

ADDENDA:
Statutes and Rules Cited
The ALJ's and Board's Rulings and Orders below

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASE AUTHORITY
Mineerv. Board of Review, Utah 572 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1977)
Tillett v. Dep't of Worforce Servs., 2004 UT App 233 (Utah App. 2004)

26
2,11, 17

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a)

1

Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-405(5)

2, 12

Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-406(4)

1, 12

RULES CITED
Utah Administrative Code, §R994-207-104

2, 10

Utah Administrative Code, § R994-406-401

12, 14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
TERRIE DAYBELL,
Petitioner/Appellant,
AppealNo.20110073-CA
vs.
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES
Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Workforce Appeals Board ("Board") issued a decision that was based on an
erroneous calculation of Petitioner's income, which was reported to the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). Upon remand from the Board, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ2")
issued a decision that was beyond the scope of the remand, which decision was ultimately
upheld by the Board. The decision of the ALJ2, as upheld by the Board, is not supported
by the evidence.

1
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As a result of the ALJ2fs decision of overpayment of unemployment compensation
benefits, which was again upheld by the Board, the Petitioner was deemed to have
committed fraud in the obtaining of such benefits. A decision that is also not supported
by the evidence.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Administrative Rules are
included in an Addendum hereto, including:
Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-405(5)
Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-406(4)
Utah Administrative Code, §R994-207-101, etseq.
Utah Administrative Code, § R994-406-401

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Workforce Appeals Board, upholding a
Decision of Administrative Law Judge, supporting (in part) a decision of the Department
of Workforce Services finding the Petitioner was overpaid unemployment compensation
benefits as a result of fraud.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References herein are to the Record of this Case ("R. [page no(s).]").
Petitioner has been a licensed mortgage loan officer in the State of Utah since
September 30, 2003. In connection with her license, Petitioner associated with the
brokerage, Key West Funding, Inc. ("Key West"). Key West was purely a brokerage and
did not act as a direct lender on any loan. Petitioner acted as an independent agent for her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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borrowers and was consistently paid commissions as a 1099 independent contractor.
Moreover, Key West did not provide Petitioner any tools or other implements to conduct
her activities as a loan officer. Key West did not provide the Petitioner an office from
which to conduct her business activities. As a result of this method of payment, these
other issues and on advice of her tax professional, Petitioner formed a corporation called
Daybell Financial, Inc. ("Daybell Financial") and made an election to be taxed as a small
business under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code ("S election"). Petitioner was
the sole shareholder of Daybell Financial.
Petitioner's relationship with Key West was consistent for all of the approximately
seven years she was associated with the brokerage. Further, the way in which she
reported her income and expenses to the IRS, which was in accordance, generally, with
advice from her accountant, has not changed from the time she entered into her business
of being a loan officer.
As a result of (a) an audit (the "Audit") of Key West's employment practices by
the Department of Workforce Services (the "Department") in or around the end of the
2009 calendar year or beginning of the 2010 calendar year, and (b) Key West being
acquired by Stearns Lending ("Stearns") at the beginning of the 2010 calendar year,
Petitioner was changed to a W-2 employee in or around March of 2010. Since that time,
Petitioner has continued to be a W-2 employee of Stearns.
After the mortgage industry was affected by the downturn in the economy at the
end of the 2007 calendar year, Petitioner began working for Convergys as a full-time
employee, while remaining as a loan officer part-time with her association with Key
3
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West. Petitioner had previously worked for Convergys, but had left to raise her family.
This re-employment with Convergys was critical to Petitioner's family because her
husband was not able to work for health reasons.
However, in early 2009, Petitioner was laid off from her employment with
Convergys because her group at Convergys had lost its funding. At the suggestion of the
human resource department of Convergys, Petitioner applied for unemployment
compensation benefits with the Department.
Petitioner was truthful, to best of her knowledge and understanding, in responding
to all inquiries of the Department, especially as related to Daybell Financial and her
compensation as a mortgage loan officer and was awarded unemployment compensation
benefits. On more than one occasion, Petitioner completed a questionnaire regarding her
relationship with Daybell Financial. (R. 295-298; provided, however, these pages only
refer to the September 2009 questionnaire. The March 2009 questionnaire, which
contains very similar answers has not been included in the Record.)
In the questionnaire, Petitioner clearly described her relationship to Daybell
Financial and her conduct as a mortgage loan officer. She also indicates that while she
has the ability to work at being a mortgage loan officer on a full-time basis, she does not
spend all of her time working on loans because she is responsible for finding her own
customers and she is not being successful at doing so. Notwithstanding her failure to find
new customers, she maintains her business, including all of the expenses that come with
owning your own business, in the hopes of finding success in the future. It is this concept
that the Department finds so incredulous:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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RIVERIA(sic)

Did you ever consider closing your business so that there would
not be a conflict between - between being self-employed and
trying to get your business up and going, and being able, and
available for full-time work?

CLAIMANT

Why would I close my business when it gives me a chance at, if
the market improved, to be able to support myself again until I
could find stable employment? Why would I do that?

RIVERIA(sic)

So that you'd be in full compliance to receive benefits,

CLAIMANT

I didn't know I wasn't in compliance. No one ever told me
throughout the year I was receiving benefits that there was a
question, or that I wasn't in compliance, ma'am. (R. 336-337)

After the Department's audit on Key West, which resulted in Key West changing
the loan officers from 1099 payees to W-2 employees, Petitioner began receiving

'

overpayment and fraud notices, the first of which was dated March 25, 2010. (R. 68-69)
Petitioner appealed the Department's decision by sending a notice of appeal dated April
12,2010. (R. 70)
An Administrative Hearing was conducted by the Department's Appeals Unit on
April 28, 2010. At that hearing, the Petitioner testified in her behalf and Eileen Rivera
and Kathy Causey represented and testified for the Department. (R. 88-135) On or about
May 12, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ1") ruled against Petitioner on a

<

technicality that Petitioner's appeal was untimely. (R. 136-138)
As a result of the ALJl's decision, Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board May 19,
2010 (R. 139-145) The Board issued its decision on June 28, 2010, in which it reversed
the decision of the ALJ1 and reduced the overpayment, but upheld the finding of fraud.
(R. 147-158) However, because Petitioner believed the Board (a) used the wrong figures

5
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from Petitioner's tax return to compute the overpayment amount and (b) erroneously
concluded the elements for fraud were present, Petitioner requested the Board reconsider
its decision on July 16, 2010. (R. 159-168)
The Board granted the Petitioner's reconsideration and issued a decision
remanding the case to a new Administrative Law Judge (ALJ2) on August 26, 2010. (R.
170-172) The remand specifically instructed ALJ2 to "take additional testimony about
each [of the claimed] deductions and write-offs and how they relate to the [Petitioner's]
business of selling mortgages." (R. 170) Also in its decision, the Board requested the
Petitioner provide certain documentation for the new hearing, which Petitioner did on
September 16, 2010. (R. 173-294)
ALJ2 conducted a hearing on September 21, 2010. (R. 304-384) As a result of the
hearing, the ALJ2 issued a decision on September 29, 2010, in which he found an
increased overpayment amount on different grounds than the Board and found fraud. (R.
385-398) Because of this decision, Petitioner again appealed to the Board on October 29,
2010. (R. 415) In a decision dated November 18, 2010, the Board upheld the decision of
theALJ2.(R. 416-427)
On December 28, 2010, Petitioner again asked the Board to reconsider its
decision. (R. 428-438) This final request for reconsideration was denied by the Board on
December 22, 2010. (R. 440-442). As a result of that denial of reconsideration, Petitioner
filed this appeal on January 21, 2011.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In its June 28, 2010 decision, the Board found the Petitioner to be self-employed
and calculated an overpayment based on that decision. In Petitioner's request for
reconsideration, Petitioner requested that the Board recalculate the overpayment amount
based on the correct numbers from Petitioner's tax return. The Board found insufficient
evidence concerning Petitioner's expenses and remanded on that issue. The ALJ2
disregarding the instructions on remand and made a determination that the Petitioner was
not self-employed and disregarded all expenses, which decision was upheld on appeal.
Further, ALJ1, ALJ2 and the Board have continuously ignored the weight of the
evidence in finding the Petitioner committed fraud.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A DETERMINATION THAT THE
DEDUCTIONS AND WRITE-OFFS CLAIMED ON HER TAX RETURN ARE
REASONABLE.

,

In its remand to the ALJ2, the Board was very clear that the purpose of the new
hearing was "to hold a new hearing, take additional testimony, and admit additional
ii

documents....Additional testimony and documentary evidence is needed to show the
deductions and write-offs which reduced the [Petitioner's] gross income from $28,575.05
to $3,368." (R. 170) The ALJ2 was "to take additional testimony about each of those

<

deductions and write-offs and how they relate to the [Petitioner's] business selling
mortgages." (R. 170) At one point of the hearing, the ALJ2 even narrowed the
i

questioning of the representative from the Department and directed the questions to
7
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focus on the deductions and write-offs, yet his decision has nothing to do with the
remand issue and, instead, revises the Board's decision concerning self-employment and
changes the method of calculating any overpayment. This issue was not remanded. The
remand was limited to the application of deductions and write-offs, regardless of the
ALJ2fs inability to fully comprehend the Petitioner's business and its expenses. (R. 389)
It is interesting to note that in his decision the ALJ2 even gave warning that it was
making its decision in contravention to the Board's remand instructions:
While the issue of whether the Claimant meets the definition of unemployed is
not an issue properly before the Administrative Law Judge to rule upon, the rules
applicable to how income is counted for individuals involved in self-employment or
commission work must be used in regard to if the [Petitioner] had work and earnings that
effected (sic) her eligibility for benefits. (R. 389)
Nowhere in the remand was the ALJ2 asked to determine if the Board had
decided the issue of self-employment correctly. The only issue was whether the
Petitioner was entitled to claim all of the deductions and write-offs reported in her tax
return for 2009. In fact early on in his decision, the ALJ2 justified his decision by
overstating what his charge on remand was when he said that the issue remanded "was in
regard to insufficient evidence in the record concerning the commission income of the
Claimant..." (emphasis added) (R. 389) Nowhere in the Board's remand does it instruct
the ALJ2 to address this issue on remand. This question was simply not before the ALJ2
on the remand and the ALJ2 has, in effect, overturned the decision of the Board, which
he did not have the authority to do.
Consequently, even if there was a need for a determination between the
application of self-employment versus commission sales, the analysis is the same. In
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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both circumstances, the Petitioner would be eligible to have her income reduced by
legitimate and reasonable business expenses.
On the issue of the remand, Ms. Daybell proffered both testimonial evidence from
her accountant, as well as documentary evidence consisting of her tax returns, Quicken
and QuickBooks reports and printouts and purchase receipts from the time period in
question (as was directed by the Board in its remand). (R. 173-294) Ms. Daybell and her
accountant both testified under oath and without impeachment or contradictory evidence
that each and every one of her deductions and write-offs were legitimate and useful to
her conduct in securing and closing mortgage loans. Questions were asked by both the
ALJ2 and the Department's representative, but the ALJ2 made no finding that any
portion of her deductions or write-offs should be disallowed. As such, said deductions
and write-offs should all be specifically allowed.
Accordingly, accepting the formula the Board used to calculate the overpayment
as the correct method of calculation, and considering the expenses, deductions and writeoffs reported on Petitioner's tax return, the overpayment amount is $1,415.60. This
number is derived from the amount listed on line 32 of Ms. Daybell's tax return (or
$3,368) and applied to each weekly reporting period as detailed on Exhibit B attached to
the Petitioner's request for reconsideration dated July 16, 2010. (R. 168). This is the
amount of supplemental income Petitioner is deemed to have received from her selfemployment activities.
i

9
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POINT II
PETITIONER SHOULD BE DETERMINED TO BE SELF-EMPLOYED UNDER
THE TERMS OF U.A.C. §994-207-104.
Notwithstanding the Board previously determining the Petitioner was selfemployed, as a result of the Board's most recent decision upholding ALJ2fs decision,
Petitioner is entitled to a determination that she is self-employed for purposes of
unemployment compensation benefits. The Board was entitled to make its decision to
uphold the ALJ2fs decision of commission sales income for two reasons. First, the issue
of self-employment had already been decided by the Board and was not properly before
the ALJ2. Second, the ALJ2 failed to consider the petitioner's deductions and write-offs
in determining any overpayment amount (as fully described under Point I above).
Section R994-207-104 of the Utah Admin. Code provides in pertinent part:
Self-employment includes services which are performed for the direct or indirect
purpose of obtaining a livelihood or a part of such livelihood. Self-employment is
generally established as a sole proprietorship or partnership.
Even though this Section provides that self-employment is generally established as a sole
proprietorship or partnership, it does not preclude other forms of self-run businesses from
being determined to be "self-employment." In fact, in this case, Petitioner has a
corporation that is only formed for tax purposes. In all other respects, she is the business.
She finds the leads, meets with the customers, prepares the applications, engages helpers,
pays the bills, negotiates the contracts, etc. The only purpose for the corporation was to
receive the income from the business and pay for the expenses from that income before
distributions were made to the Petitioner. Accordingly, the income generated through her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

mortgage loan officer license and received by Daybell Financial should be analyzed
under the guise of self-employment.
POINT III
PETITIONER SHOULD BE DETERMINED TO BE AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR AT THE TIME OF HER APPLICATION AND RECEIPT OF
BENEFITS.
The Board and the ALJ2 have also taken the position that Petitioner was an
employee of Key West for the period of time that she applied for benefits and was
receiving benefits. This determination is based on the Audit. (R. 391) The ALJ2 and
Board make the erroneous conclusion that the Petitioner should be deemed an employee
of Key West because the Department conducted the Audit on Key West at the conclusion
of the Petitioner's benefit period and determined that all of Key West's loan officer were
employees and not independent contractors. Petitioner had treated herself as an
independent contractor and received a 1099 from Key West for approximately six years
before the Department conducted the Audit. Immediately upon the conclusion of the
Audit, all parties began following the Department's determination (albeit out of some
protest). Because Petitioner was an independent contractor at the time of her application
for and receipt of benefits, she is better analyzed as a self-employed business, rather than
the commission sales that the ALJ2 and Board determined.
However, even if Petitioner is deemed to have always been a commissioned
employee rather that a self-employed business, the ALJ2 and Board are incorrect that she
"is not eligible for deductions from that income for unemployment insurance purposes."
(R. 391) To hold such a conclusion would be counter to the concept of unreimbursed

11
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business expenses. If Petitioner is not allowed to deduct business expenses from her
income, then that income is grossly overstated and does not reflect the costs that she
incurs to create that income. In this respect she is then treated differently than a W-2
employ who is entitled to keep all of his or her income for personal purposes and does
not have business expenses that are eligible for deduction from income as a result of an
employer not reimbursing the same.
POINT IV
PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.C.A.
§35A-4-405, U.C.A. §35A-4-406 OR U.A.C. §§R994-406-401.
The Board described the elements of fraud by citing Utah Admin. Code R994406-401. This Rule provides as follows:
R994-406-401.

Claimant Fraud.

(1) All three elements of fraud must be proved to establish an
intentional misrepresentation sufficient to constitute fraud. The three
elements are:
(a)

Materiality.

(i)
Materiality is established when a claimant
makes false statements or fails to provide accurate
information for the purpose of obtaining;
(A) any benefit payment to which the
claimant is not entitled, or
(B) waiting week credit which results in a
benefit payment to which the claimant is not entitled.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ii)
A benefit payment received by fraud may
include an amount as small as one dollar over the amount a
claimant was entitled to receive.
(b)

Knowledge.

A claimant must have known or should have known the
information submitted to the Department was incorrect or that he or
she failed to provide information required by the Department. The
claimant does NOT have to know that the information will result in
the denial of benefits or a reduction of the benefit amount.
Knowledge can also be established when a claimant recklessly
makes representations knowing he or she has sufficient information
upon which to base such representations. A claimant has an
obligation to read material provided by the Department or to ask a
Department representative when he or she has a questions about
what information to report.
(c)

Willfulness.
i

Willfulness is established when a claimant files claims or
other documents containing false statements, responses or deliberate
omissions....
i

Essentially, then, the Department is charged with showing that the claimant
intentionally given or withheld relevant information in the obtaining of unemployment
compensation benefits. The ALJ2 and Board concluded that because Petitioner failed to
report commission income in the weeks that she received benefits that the elements of
fraud were met. However, the clear and convincing evidence is this: First, Petitioner

{

freely and clearly indicated that she was a licensed mortgage loan officer and had been
since 2003. Second, that she considered herself as self-employed and had a corporation
(

(Daybell Financial), which was set up to receive commission checks from loan closing
13
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and pay business expenses. Third, because she did not understand her reporting
requirements for the payments from Key West to Daybell Financial, Petitioner had on
several occasions engaged in verbal communications with the Department (as suggested
by U.A.C. §R994-406-401(l)(b)) and disclosed that Daybell Financial had received
commission checks from Key West for closed loans, but that she had not personally
taken any money out of the corporation on advice from her accountant so that there
would always be funds in the corporation's account to pay the corporation's obligations.
Based, on those communications, Petitioner was informed by more than one
representative of the Department that she did not have a reporting obligation if she did
not disburse funds to herself from her corporation. The fact is, Petitioner wouldn't even
have known how much she would disburse to herself out of Daybell financial until the
end of the year and her taxes were prepared (which occurred after she stopped receiving
benefits).
Petitioner testified that her nature is to be completely straightforward, which she
was with the Department when applying for benefits and which she was while receiving
benefits.

She fully disclosed that she was self-employed through Daybell Financial.

Petitioner was fully prepared to not receive unemployment compensation benefits if she
didn't qualify as a result of her self employment status. That is why she truthfully
reported her relationship with Daybell Financial and all of the commission checks that
that the corporation received. At all time during the receipt of benefits, the commissions
were reported as being paid to Daybell Financial, but not to Petitioner personally—not
because she was trying to hide the commissions, but because this had been her practice
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,14
may contain errors.

as an S-corporation for years at the advice of her accountant. She had no intent to
misrepresent any aspect of her self-employment nature and made every effort to be open
and truthful about her commission income.
The ALJ2 and Board have concluded that Petitioner made inaccurate statements
on her questionnaire when she said "made no money in 2008" when she closed several
mortgage loans under her license and her corporation received commission checks from
Key West. Petitioner however, clearly testified that this statement was based on the fact
that she did not take any money from the Daybell Financial after the commission checks
were paid to the corporation. This was not intended to be a misleading statement, but a
truthful statement based on advice from her tax professional.
The Board quotes the Claimant Guide as evidence that the Petitioner was
inaccurate in her reporting. However, the Petitioner did exactly what the Claimant Guide
suggests she do—i.e., contact the Claims Center. She had specific conversations with the
Department concerning her reporting and was told she was in compliance. She clearly
reported to the Department that her corporation had received commission income, but
that she had not paid herself out of the corporation. Again, this was both technically
accurate as well as truthful. In fact, during the hearing on remand, the Department's
representative even apologized to the Petitioner to the extent that any of the
Department's staff had mislead or misinformed her as to her reporting requirement.
In its decision, the Board relied on Mineer v. Board of Review, Utah 572 P.2d
1364 (1977) in determining which weeks the Petitioner committed fraud. However, the
facts of Mineer do not apply to this case. Mineer specifically involved a case in which
15
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the claimant earned actual weekly wages paid to him and nnsivpnrtal lliosc wa^es In
this case, as has beei 1 discussed prev 101 is!/) r , tl ic li indai i tental issue has to do with tl le way
in which the Petitioner's income was earned and then the Petitioner's reporting of that
income,. It was not possible to determine her income during the time that her reporting
was required. She had no abilit> to even estii i late v Il lat 1 iei: expei lses vv on iiicl be f oi ai ly
i\eekk period because thev can fluctuate so much during any calendar year. I he only
clear w a y to determine what to report is at the end of the year when, her taxes were
prepared.
Finally the Board ai id \I ,12 I lave relied 01 1 I illett v Dep!t of Worforce Servs.,
2004 UT App 233 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) to suggest that the Petitioner is claiming that she
was necessarily mislead by the Department. Petitioner's argument, however is not so
much, that she was mislead., \ >ut rati iei that she fi ill} i epoi ted and tl le Depai tment
accepted her verbal report as being sufficient. She has maintained throughout this entire
process that she has clearly and accurately stated what her employment and income have
been. The Board and AI J.2 have misinterpreted what she has said

a heavy reliance on a.

siaien lent oi no i lew "home loans " I hat is not. the reason for not reporting income,
rather (as has been iterated and reiterated), she full} disclosed, the nature of the
commissions earned by her license as a loan officer, that those commissions were paid to
Daybell Financial that Daybell 1 7inat iciai. \\ as her corporatioi i that 1 ier ace oi it itat it 1 lad
advised her for more than a six year period to not pull money out of her corporation until
all of the corporate expenses had been covered, and that she had not paid herself from
the commissions earned by hei cot pot i itioi i Ai i i losi tl: u i < ,)i 1II3 I .1 lit ig tl tat tl le C I,< 1.1.11 mi it
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may have failed to report to the Department was the time she spent in her corporation
trying to get additional loans and the time she spent working on any loans she did have.
To the extent that such was required, she may have mistakenly believed she did not need
to so report such time. Her testimony clearly states on this issue that she believed that the
Claimant Guide instructed the reporting of time in work for that work that would
necessarily lead to a paycheck. This is especially the case when you consider the fact
that she had not paid herself out of her corporation. Therefore, it was questionable in her
mind whether she was acting as an self-employed person without compensation or a
business owner attempting to further the interests of her equity without any direct
compensation for such activities. In the end, the fact is she did not intend to defraud. As
such, Petitioner did not willfully mislead the Department. She was trustful and accurate
in her representations, both written and verbal.
CONCLUSION
The Decisions of the Board and ALJ2 should modified and reversed.

The

overpayment amount should be adjusted to be $1,415.60. Moreover, Petitioner was
completely open and honest with the Department throughout both the application
process, as well as the reporting periods after benefits were approved. Further, Petitioner
did not knowingly omit information when reporting to the Department, and in fact,
verbally reported the nature of commissions to representatives of the Department. She
made full disclosures throughout the entire process. Accordingly, Petitioner has not
committed fraud. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court find in her favor and
modify and reverse the Board's Decision.
17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2nd day of December. 201
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ADDENDUM OF S I \ i I IES ANDRl II ES
I JtahCode Am i $78A-4-103(2)(a)
§78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and. to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry n ito effect its judgments orders arid decrees; oi
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction including jurisdiction o r
interlocutory appeals, over:
;. :ne nnal orders and decrees resulting from, formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies., except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division, of Forestry, Fire, and State
Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources. Board, of Oil. Gas., and Mining., and, the state
engineer;
Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-405(5)
§35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an indh ridual is ; ii leiigible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:

(5) (a) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a false
statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an additional 13
weeks for the first week the statement or representation was made or fact
withheld and six weeks for each week thereafter; the additional weeks ilot
to exceed 49 weeks.
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(b)The additional period shall commence on the Sunday following the
issuance of a determination finding the claimant in violation of this
Subsection (5).
(c) (i)

Each claimant found in violation of this Subsection (5) shall repay to
the division the overpayment and, as a civil penalty, an amount equal
to the overpayment.

(ii)

The overpayment is the amount of benefits the claimant received by
direct reason of fraud.

(iii)

The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this
chapter.

(iv)

These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the
manner provided in Subsections 35A-4-305(3) and (5).

(d) A claimant is ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit, and any
wage credits earned by the claimant shall be unavailable for purposes of
paying benefits, if any amount owed under this Subsection (5) remains
unpaid.

i

(e) Determinations under this Subsection (5) shall be appealable in the manner
provided by this chapter for appeals from other benefit determinations.
(f) If the fraud determination is based solely on unreported or underreported
work or earnings, or both, and the claimant would have been eligible for
benefits if the work or earnings, or both, had been correctly reported, the
individual does not lose eligibility for that week because of the
misreporting but is liable for the overpayment and subject to the penalties
in Subsection (5)(c) and the disqualification periods for future weeks in
Subsection (5)(a).

<

Utah Code Ann., §35A-4-406(4)
§ 35A-4-406. Claims for benefits - Continuing jurisdiction - Appeal - Notice of
decision - Repayment of benefits fraudulently received

(4) (a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as benefits
under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the sum to the
division for the fund.
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jb) If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received any sum as benefits
under this chapter to which under a redetermination or decision pursuant to
this section he has been found not entitled, he shall repay the sum, or shall,
in the discretion of the division, have; the sum deducted from any future
benefits payable to him., or both
(c) In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is liable to repay to
the division any sum for the fund, the sum shall be collectible in the same
manner as provided for contributions due under this chapter
Utah Administrative Code, §R994-207-104.
R994-207-104. Self-Employment
(1) Self-employment includes services which are performed for the direct or
indirect purpose of obtaining a livelihood or a part of such livelihood. Selfemployment is generally established as a sole proprietorship or partnership. An
individual is not self-employed when a farm is operated only to supplement the
'family food supply 01 as a place on which to raise the family ", but is i lot
operated for the purpose of selling produce. Individuals in self- employment
must report time spent engaged in self-employment activities such as time
spent about the place of business either working or awaiting calls for goods or
services and time spent seeking customers or business for the self-employment
venture.
(a) Income from Self-Employment.
Some claimants are engaged in part-time, self-employment which produces
an immediate, readily determined weekly income. Claimants must report
the amounts received for goods bought, supplies purchased, services, rent,
etc. These are reasonable business expenses which can be deducted from
gross income for goods and services. Payment of loans for buildings or
equipment used. in. the business are not a deductible expense. Claimants
engaged in this type of self- employment must maintain detailed records
describing each item of income and expense. Fhe Department may audit
those records without prior notice
(b) income Not Readily Determinable.
(i) When an individual is engaged in i an enterprise that on a year-round.
basis is less thai1 full-time and the income cannot be clearly determined
for each week, the weekly earnings will be determined on the basis of
all available information concerning past income and expenses of the
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enterprise, from which a weekly amount will be computed to represent
the potential net income. The amount determined must be reported on
the weekly claim. Evidence of changes in the enterprise that would
affect the potential income for the present must be reported to the
Department and the reportable income will be re-evaluated.. Furnishing
evidence of past income and expenses is the claimant's responsibility
and may be obtained from personal or business records, income tax
returns, etc. for the past three years. It will then be averaged to
determine a potential weekly amount to be reported each week by the
claimant. A claimant may earn up to 30% of his weekly benefit amount
in total self-employment plus work for wages before a reduction is made
in the unemployment insurance payment for that week. When the
estimated income amount equals or exceeds the weekly benefit amount,
the claimant is "not unemployed" and benefits will not be allowed.
(ii) When a claimant has just entered into a new business or is expanding
and has no actual income experience which may be used as evidence of
potential income for the current period, he must make a reasonable
estimate. This may be based on any available evidence such as a general
knowledge of current prices of products bought and marketed, estimated
yields, estimated expense, etc. Any estimated amounts should be so
identified.
(c) Over Estimates of Income.
If the Department or claimant has over estimated the amount reportable in
self-employment, the claimant may make a claim for the amount owed. The
claim must be made within 30 days of when the correct earnings were
determinable.
Utah Administrative Code, § R994-406-401
R994-406-401. Claimant Fraud
(1) All three elements of fraud must be proved to establish an intentional
misrepresentation sufficient to constitute fraud. See section 35A-4-405(5). The
three elements are:
(a) Materiality.
(i) Materiality is established when a claimant makes false statements or
fails to provide accurate information for the purpose of obtaining;
(A)

any benefit payment to which the claimant is not entitled, or
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(B)

waiting week credit which i: csi llts ii i a bei lefit pay i i: i,ei it tc • 1 \ hicllh,
the claimant is not entitled

(ii) A benefit paynlent received by fraud may include an amount as small as
one dollar over the amount a claimant was entitled to receive.
(b) Knowledge.
A claimant must have known or should have known the information
submitted to the Department was incorrect or that he or she failed to
provide information required by the Department. The claimant does NOT
have to know that the information will result in a denial of benefits or a,
reduction of the benefit amount. Knowledge can also be established wllei1 a
claimant recklessly makes representations knowing he or she has
insufficient information upon which to base such representations. \
claimant has an obligation to read material provided by the Department and
to ask a Department representative if he or she has a question about what
information to report.
(c) Willfulness.
Willfulness is established when a claimant files claims or other documents
containing false statements, responses or deliberate omissions. If a claimant
delegates the responsibility to personally provide information or allows
access to his or her Personal Identification Number (PIN) so that someone
else may file a claim , the claimant, is responsible for t,I le information
provided or omitted by the other person, even if the claimant :iad :t
advance knowledge that the information provided was false or important
information was omitted. The claimant is responsible for securing the debit
card (card) issued by the Department. Securing the card means that the card
and the PIN are never kept together, the card is kept in a secure location,
and the PIN is not known by anyone but the claimant. If a claimant loses
his or her' card., the claimant must report the loss of t,l i,e card to the
Department and change his or her PIN immediately even if the claimant, is
not currently filing weekly claims for benefits. If the claimant fails to report
the loss of the card and change the PIN immediately, or fails to secure the
card, the claimant will be liable for claims made and money removed from
the card.
(2) The Department relies primarily on information provided by the claimant when
paying unemployment insurance benefits. Fraud penalties do not apply if the
overpayment was the result of an, inadvertent error Fraud requires a willful
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misrepresentation or concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining
unemployment benefits.
(3) The absence of an admission or direct proof of intent to defraud does not
prevent a finding of fraud.
(4) A claimant is required, under R994-403-114c, to immediately notify the
Department if the claimant is incarcerated. Upon notification, the Department
will stop all unemployment benefits to the claimant until the claimant notifies
the Department of his or her release from incarceration. If a claimant fails to
notify the Department of his or her incarceration, any claims made during the
incarceration period will be considered fraudulent.
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THE ALJ'S AND BOARD'S RULINGS AND ORDERS BELOW
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPEALS UNIT

Form APDlfC
10

Decision of Administrative Law Judge

TERRIE DAYBELL
2757 W 2100 N
CLINTON UT 84015-7693

S.S.A. NO:

XXX-XX-0327

CASE NO:

10-A-13318-R

APPEAL DECISION: The fraud overpayment and penalty are affirmed but modified to $21,070.
The fraud disqualification from March 28, 2010 to May 5, 2011, is affirmed.
CASE HISTORY:
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

Claimant/Department
35A-4-405(5)
35A-4-406(4)
-

Fraud
Fault Overpayment

A decision from the Workforce Appeals Board denied unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks
ending April 4; May 16; May 30; June 13; September 5; October 3; and December 19,2009, on the grounds
the Claimant failed to accurately report her work and earnings and, therefore, knowingly withheld material
information in order to receive benefits to which she was not entitled. The Claimant was further disqualified
for 49 weeks, beginning March 28, 2010, and ending May 5, 2011. This decision also affirmed a fraud
overpayment and penalty, but modified the amount of the fraud overpayment to $2,928, and a civil penalty
of $2,928, resulting in a total overpayment of $5,856.
The Claimant requested the Board reconsider its decision. The Board granted the Claimant's request for
reconsideration and remanded the case to an Administrative Law Judge to hold a new hearing, take
additional testimony, to accept additional documents to show the deductions and write oils that reduced the
Claimant's gross income from her business from $28,575.05 to $3,368. The remand directed that testimony
about those deductions and write offs and how they related to the Claimant's business selling mortgages was
to be gathered and to issue a new decision, even if that new decision merely upholds the Administrative Law
Judge's prior decision.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will becomefinalunless, within 30 days from September 29,
2010, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City,
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http:/Avww jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal is made.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
Toward the end of 2003 the Claimant obtained her mortgage license. The Claimant entered into doing this
type of occupational work with the intent of being able to do some sort of employment from home part-lime.
The Claimant was hired to work as a mortgage officer by Key West Funding, Inc. The Claimant was told
by this employer that it employs its mortgage officers as independent contractors. The Claimant could not
work with any other company and had to utilize the funding sources available through Key West. The
employer did not help the Claimant obtain business; this was something the Claimant had to do on her own.
The Claimant sought advice from a tax accountant who indicated the Claimant should set up an "S"
coiporation to receive the commission payments from the employer and pay her business expenses through
this corporation and a business account. The Claimant set up a separate bank account for the business which
she named Daybell Financial, Inc.
Over the next few years the Claimant was actively involved in this line of work. The Claimant never spent
a full 40 hours in a week doing the meeting with clients and processing loans associated with this business,
but thought about the business "24-hours a day," including ways to increase her client base and income.
In 2006 the Claimant had commission sales paid to the S corporation of $33,258. After applying expenses
the Claimant ended up with ordinary business income of $14,174, For 2007 the Claimant had $28,133 in
commissions paid to her corporation. Based on the advice of her tax accountant who told her she needed
to take a reasonable salary if she was going to have a large profit, she paid herself $ 10,000 for the work done
in the company and had ordinary business income at the end of the year of $6,952.
In 2008 the mortgage business changed dramatically due to substantial decreases in the housing market
related in part to problems with subprime mortgage loans. The Claimant obtained employment as an
employee working for Convergys to supplement her earnings. From the Claimant's work as a mortgage
officer she received gross commissions of $7,456 paid to her corporation in 2008 with an ordinary business
loss of $21 after expenses were deducted. The Claimant had been counseled by her accountant that she
should not compensate herself in advance if there was likely to be not enough funds to cover all the
expenses; and so the Claimant had made no salary disbursements to herself in 2008.
In 2009 the Claimant was laid off from her job working for Convergys. The Claimant continued to work
as a mortgage officer attempting to generate income from offering refinancing of home loans. The
opportunity to have clients qualify for a new home loan practically ceased due to the more stringent
mortgage loan requirements put into place after the subprime mortgage loan crisis.
The Claimant received a commission check on January 28, 2009, for $1,533; a commission check on
February 3,2009, for $ 1,815; a commission check on February 13,2009, for $2,687.50. On March 6,2009,
the Claimant deposited a commission check for $1,173.75.
The Claimant was concerned about the lack of potential for future commissions and filed an unemployment
insurance claim on March 9, 2009, reporting a reduction of force from her job with Convergys in January
2009. The Claimant also reported that she was still working part-time for the employer Daybel! Financial,
Inc.
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The Claimant answered yes to the question on the initial claim if she worked on a commission or was an
officer in a corporation; writing she was an officer of a corporation for Daybell Financial, that she had been
doing this for six years, she receives zero commission monthly from the job, and spends about five hours
a week in the position. She answered "no" to the question if she could work full-time in this position;
explaining that she was self-employed and was only paid when she closed a loan and after the business
expenses had been covered. The Claimant wrote she had not made any money since the end of 2007 and she
kepi her license to do loans for people if the new construction business picks back up. Based on the
information the Claimant provided it was determined that she met the definition of being unemployed since
she reported working minimally in self-employment, full-time work was not available, and that the Claimant
was seeking full-time employment.
A status questionnaire tor Employers was mailed to Daybell Financial, lnc on March 11, 2009. The
Claimant received the questionnaire and completed it; writing that she had been employed by Daybel!
Financial as a mortgage loan officer, that she represents herself to be self-employed in a trade occupation
or business under the business name of Daybell Financial, lnc, that she was paid on commission that she
could not negotiate, and that she was reimbursed by Daybell Financial for out of pocket expenses. The
Claimant signed this as the president of the company. A status questionnaire for workers was also sent to
the Claimant which she completed, indicating she intended to be self-employed in a trade occupation or
business and was self-employed as a mortgage loan officer and was hoping that business would pick back
up.
Based on reported earnings the Claimant was found to be eligible for a maximum payable benefit of $ 10,062
with a weekly benefit amount of $387 each week for a total of 26 weeks. The Claimant also qualified ioi
a $25 stimulus payment amount on the weekly claims she submitted. The Claimanl. began to collect
unemployment benefits, submitting weekly claims reporting each week that she was not working, The
Claimant understood the question if she had worked that week to be in reference to working as an employee
for wages. The Claimant had received the Claimant Guide which she did not read through. The guide
specified all work, including self-employment or commission work, must be reported each week.
On May 26, 2009, the Claimant was issued a commission check made out to her corporation for $593.13.
On March 31,2009, a commission check was issued to the Claimant's corporation for $348.75. On April 3,
2009, the Claimant was issued a check to her corporation for $2,987.74, On April 14,2009, the Claimant
was issued a commission check to her corporation for $610. On May 13, 2009, a commission check made
out to the Claimant's corporation was issued in the amount of $1,135. On May 26, 2009, a commission
check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount f $2,887.50. On May 27,2009, a commission
check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount of $729.38. On June 11,2009, a commission
check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount of $3,581.25. On August 31, 2009, a
commission check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount of $ 1,944. On October 1, 2009,
a commission check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount of $3,221.80. On December 18,
2009, a commission check was issued to the Claimant's corporation in the amount of $3,327.25.
i

Hach time a commission check was issued to the Claimant she did not report this to the Department of
Workforce Services on her weekly claims. The Claimant was not issuing a salary to herself from her
corporation bank account and was keeping the funds from commissions in the business account to be
available to pay expenses. It generally takes the Claimant 30 days from contact with a client to get the loan
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processed, working on the loan on average of a few hours each week during that time frame. Fhe Claimant
did not keep track of the hours she spent each day working on the different loans that ended up paying her
commission.
The Claimant filed for an emergency extension of unemployment insurance benefits on September 15,2009.
The Claimant again answered "yes" to being an officer of a corporation and stating she was receiving zero
commission from this work. The Claimant answered she was not receiving any commission for the work
since she was not drawing a salary from the corporation and waiting to see what her expenses would be for
the year. The Claimant also wrote that she had spent zero hours doing this work and that unless she can find
someone who qualifies and is in the market to buy a new home, she has no business and makes no money.
In a further contact with a Department representative the Claimant reported she had closed one loan a few
months ago, but after she paid her business expenses, an ongoing training class, and paid licensing fees to
stay licensed, she did not make any money from the loan. The Claimant reported she keeps her license
current so she can help with family should they decide to buy a house or in case the market picks up. Based
on information the Claimant provided it was determined she still met the definition of being unemployed.
The Department began an audit on the company that was paying the Claimant commission, Key West
Funding. A decision was made in October 2009 that the Claimant was in fact an employee of that employer
and should not have been paid as an independent contractor. The commissions paid to the Claimant were
ruled to be earnings of an employee and added to the Claimant's quarterly report of earnings.
On November 5, 2009, the Claimant was sent a notice of a monetary redetermination finding that she
qualified for a weekly benefit amount of $444 with an additional S25 stimulus payment being made each
week. The Department supplemented the Claimant's benefits issued to date back to the benefit week of
April 26, 2009, based on this change. This increase in the monetary eligibility was related to the fact that
the commissions from Key West Funding had been added as countable wages that increased her maximum
payable, and weekly benefit amount allocations, The Department ruled that the commissions from Key West
Funding in the first quarter of 2009 were wages of $8,151. The Department ruled that the commissions from
Key West Funding in the second quarter of 2009 were wages of $11,931. The Department ruled that the
commissions from Key West Funding in the third quarter of 2009 were wages of $1,944, The Department
ruled that the commissions from Key West Funding in the forth quarter of 2009 were wages of $6,549.
Daybell Financial, Inc also reported the Claimant having no wages in 2009 and wages of $ 1,000 for the first
quarter of 2010.
The Claimant's income taxes for her corporation and her personal income were completed by her accountant
based on the information the Claimant provided to him including her report of commission earnings and
expenses. These tax forms were signed by the Claimant on February 24, 2010.
On the 2009 1120S tax form it was reported for the Claimant's S corporation gross receipts or sales were
$27,896. From that amount expenses were deducted on the form representing $22 paid for taxes and
licenses; $395 in interest costs; $184 in depreciation; $374 in advertising; $247 for accounting; $1,721 in
automobile expense (calculated by utilizing the costs established by the IRS of 55 cents per mile and
multiplying that by 3,140 miles related to business); bank charges of $165; dues and subscriptions of$201;
gifts to clients and potential customers of $1,195; independent contractor expenses of $7,893 (which
included what the Claimant paid to friends and family to help her do business items such as cleaning her
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office, shoveling snow, and handing out business cards); $1,211 that represented 50 percent of meals and
entertainment the Claimant spent on trying to obtain business or entertaining business clients; $3,675 in
office expenses; $79 in postage shipping; $450 for a security alarm in the home; $250 in travel related to
a trip to southern Utah where the Claimant was trying to increase business; $4,289 in communication costs
(including monthly phone service at her business office in her home, a fax line, and cell phone usage of
$200 to $300 a month); and $60 for fees for obtaining specific credit reports when that cost was not covered
by the company offering the loan. This represents total deductions taken on her tax return of $22,411
resulting in an ordinary business income of $5,485.
From the $5,485 the Claimant deducted the full cost of a new laptop computer she purchased of $2,117.
This deduction was allowed under Section 179 which allows a business to deduct the full purchase price
from the business income. This resulted in a remaining income of $3,368 which was reported on the
Claimant's personal income tax as income she received from the S corporation. The difference between the
commission paid to the Claimant in 2009 and the allowable business expenses deducted results in an
additional $2,238 not claimed as income for the business on the tax return and could be considered to be
additional income the Claimant utilized for personal expenses since they were not allowed to be counted as
business expenses.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The issue remanded by the Workforce Appeals Board to the Administrative Law Judge to conduct a new
hearing was in regard to insufficient evidence in the record concerning the commission income of the
Claimant and the amount of expenses the Claimant claimed from that income in 2009. While the issue of
whether the Claimant met the definition of being unemployed was not remanded back to the Administrative
Law Judge, looking at the expenses the Claimant claimed for 2009, and comparing that with her testimony
that she was constantly thinking about her business 24-hours a day of how to increase that business to
support her family, it is difficult to reconcile that testimony with the Claimant's additional testimony that
she would spend only five to ten hours a week actually working on the business. When looking at some of
the expenses claimed such as travel, communication, and having other individuals work in her business, and
the amount of time she spent for dining and entertaining potential clients or clients, it is hard to understand
how she could incur all these expenses if she was only working in the position five to ten hours a week.
While the issue of whether the Claimant meets the definition of unemployed is not an issue properly before
the Administrative Law Judge to rule upon, the rules applicable to how income is counted for individuals
involved in self-employment or commission work must be used in regard to if the Claimant had work and
earnings that effected her eligibility for benefits. The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section
35A-4-207 of the Utah Employment Security Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-207-104.

Self-Employment.

(1)
Self-employment includes services which are performed for the direct or indirect
purpose of obtaining a livelihood or a part of such livelihood. Self-employment is generally
established as a sole proprietorship or partnership. An individual is not self-employed when
a farm is operated only to supplement the family food supply or as a place on which to raise
the family, but is not operated for the purpose of selling produce. Individuals in self-
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employment must report time spent engaged in self-employment activities such as time spent
about the place of business either working or awaiting calls for goods or services and time
spent seeking customers or business for the self-employment venture.
(a)

Income from Self-Employment.

Some claimants are engaged in part-time, self-employment which produces an
immediate, readily determined weekly income. Claimants must report the amounts received
for goods bought, supplies purchased, services, rent, etc. These are reasonable business
expenses which can be deducted from gross income for goods and services. Payment of
loans for buildings or equipment used in the business are not a deductible expense.
Claimants engaged in this type of self-employment must maintain detailed records describing
each item of income and expense. The Department may audit those records without prior
notice.
(b)

Income Not Readily Determinable.

(i)
When an individual is engaged in an enterprise that on a year-round basis is less
than full-time and the income cannot be clearly determined for each week, the weekly
earnings will be determined on the basis of all available information concerning past income
and expenses of the enterprise, from which a weekly amount will be computed to represent
the potential net income, The amount determined must be reported on the weekly claim.
Evidence of changes in the enterprise that would affect the potential income for the present
must be reported to the Department and the reportable income will be re-evaluated.
Furnishing evidence of past income and expenses is the claimant's responsibility and may be
obtained from personal or business records, income tax returns, etc. for the past three years.
It will then be averaged to determine a potential weekly amount to be reported each week by
the claimant. A claimant may earn up to 30% of his weekly benefit amount in total selfemployment plus work for wages before a reduction is made in the unemployment insurance
payment for that week, When the estimated income amount equals or exceeds the weekly
benefit amount, the claimant is "not unemployed" and benefits will not be allowed.
(ii)
When a claimant has just entered into a new business or is expanding and has no
actual income experience which may be used as evidence of potential income for the current
period, he must make a reasonable estimate. This may be based on any available evidence
such as a general knowledge of current prices of products bought and marketed, estimated
yields, estimated expense, etc. Any estimated amounts should be so identified.
R994-207-106.
(1)

Commission Selling.

Time.

If the time spent on commission selling is part-time because of limits imposed by the
limited geographical area, limited clientele, or limited products, the claimant could, upon
meeting all other provisions of the Act, be allowed benefits.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Tcrrie Daybell
(2)

10-A-13318-R

Income.

Il is necessary to distribute the income from commission sales over the period of time it
took to earn the commission. The income should be reported during the week in which the
sale is made and not when the payment is received. If it is not possible to determine the
exact amount of the commission, an estimate should be made and if the estimate is later
determined to be wrong, the claimant should immediately report to the Department to receive
assistance in making adjustments. Failure to report under estimates may result in claimant
fault overpayments and a disqualification under the fraud provisions of the Act.
Based on the determination by the Department of Workforce Services that the Claimant was an employee
working for Key West Funding and not an independent contractor, and the Department giving her credit for
the commission earnings as bona fide-covered employment and earnings for the calculation of
unemployment insurance claims, it cannot be found that the Claimant was self-employed. This is true even
if she chose to characterize her commission income and expenses as self-employment on her 2009 tax return.
As the commission has been found to be earnings of an employee., the Claimant is not eligible for deductions
from thai income for unemployment insurance purposes.
As the commissions are found to be earnings, it is necessary to distribute the income from the commission
sales over the period of time it took the Claimant to earn the commission. Although asked several times at
the hearing, the Claimant could not come up with any recollection of the time she spent associated with each
commission check she received. Rather, the Claimant answered that it generally takes 30 days from the time
she starts to work on processing a mortgage loan with a customer to its closing. It is therefore found, based
on the best information available, that for each commission check received it would be attributed to the
benefit week received as well as the three preceding benefit weeks.
Since the Claimant filed her initial unemployment insurance claim effective March 8,2009, the commission
check deposited on March 6, 2009, is not found to be earnings attributable to the first benefit week of the
unemployment insurance claim.
The commission check of $593 issued to the Claimant on March 26,2009, is found to be attributable to the
benefit weeks of March 1 through March 28, 2009. When $593 is divided by four it results in $148 in
countable earnings being applied to each of these weeks.
The commission check issued to the Claimant on March 31,2009, in the amount of $348.75 is attributable
to the benefit period of March 8 through April 4 with $87 attributable as commission earnings in each of
these weeks.
The commission check issued to the Claimant on April 3,2009., in the amount of $2,987.74 is attributable
to the work spent to earn these commissions during the benefit week of March 8 through April 4,2009, with
$746 in commission earnings attributable to each of these weeks.
The $610 commission check issued to the Claimant on April 14, 2009, is attributable to the benefit weeks
of March 22 through April 18, 2009,
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The commission check the Claimant received on May 13, 2009, in the amount of $] J35 is attributable
earnings for the benefit weeks of April 19 through May 16, 2009 with $283 attributable to each of these
weeks.
The commission check the Claimant was issued on May 26,2009, in the amount of $2,887.50 is attributable
commission earnings for the benefit weeks of May 3 through May 30,2009 with $721 attributable to each
of these weeks. The additional commission check the Claimant was issued on May 27, 2009, of $729.38
is attributable to the same period of May 3 through May 30, 2009, with $182 in additional commission
earnings attributable to each of these weeks.
The commission check issued to the Claimant on June 11,2009, in the amount of $3,581.25 is attributable
to the benefit weeks of May 17 through June 13,2009, with $895 attributable in commission to each of these
weeks.
The commission check the Claimant was issued on August 31,2009, in the amount of $ 1,944 is attributable
to the benefit weeks of August 9 through September 5,2009, with $486 in commission earnings attributable
to each of these weeks.
The commission check the Claimant received on October 1,2009, in the amount of $3,22 ] .80 is attributable
to the period of September 6 through October 3, 2009, with $805 in attributable commission earnings for
each of these benefit weeks.
The commission check the Claimant received on December 18, 2009, in the amount of $3,327.25 is
attributable to time spent earning the commission during the benefit weeks of November 22 through
December 19, 2009, with attributable commission earnings of $831 in each of these benefit weeks.
Based on the above findings of when the commissions were attributable to the described benefit weeks, the
Claimant had countable commission earnings totaling $981 for the benefit week of March 8 through
March 14, 2009. This amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly benefit amount of $444. The
Claimant was not eligible for waiting week credit for this benefit week.
Based on the attributed commission earnings the Claimant had total commission earnings for the benefit
week of March 15 through March 21, 2009, of $981. As this amount was in excess of her weekly benefit
amount, the Claimant received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive for this week.
Based on the attributed commission earnings the Claimant received a total of $ 1,133 in commission earnings
for the benefit week of March 22 through March 28, 2009. As this amount was in excess of the weekly
benefit amount, the Claimant received $443 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant received a total amount of commission attributable
for the benefit week of March 29 through April 4, 2009, is $985. As this amount was in excess of the
weekly benefit amount, the Claimant received $412 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had commission earnings of $152 for the benefit
week of April 5 through April 11, 2009. Since this is the first week the Claimant would have qualified for
benefits since her earnings are less than the weekly benefit amount, this week becomes her waiting week.
Therefore, the Claimant was not eligible to received $469 in benefits that were issued for this week.
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Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had commission earnings of $152 for the benefit
week of April 12 through April 18,2009. Based on the amount of benefits originally issued to the Claimant
and the latter increase in the weekly benefit amount that is applicable to this week, it is found the Claimant
was not issued more benefits that she was eligible to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had commission earnings of $283 for the benefit
week of April 19 through April 25, 2009. The Claimant received $150 in benefits she was not entitled to
receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had commission earnings of $283 for the benefit
week of April 26 through May 2, 2009, The Claimant received $150 in benefits she was not entitled to
receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $1J 86
for the benefit week of May 3 through May 9, 2009. As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $1,186
for the benefit week of May 10 through May 16, 2009. As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $1,798
for the benefit week of May 17 through May 23,2009. As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $1,798
for the benefit week of May 24 through May 30,2009, As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $895
for the benefit week of May 31 through June 6, 2009. As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
Based on the attributed commission sales the Claimant had total commission sales in the amount of $895
for the benefit week of June 7 through June 13, 2009. As the commission earnings were in excess of the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount, she received $469 in benefits she was not entitled to receive this week.
For the benefit week of August 9 through August 15,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive $486 in
commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly benefit
amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of August 16 through August 22, 2009, the Claimant has been found to receive $486
in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
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For the benefit week of August 23 through August 29,2009, the Claimant has beerrfound to receive S486
in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of August 30 through September 5,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive $486
in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of September 6 through September 12,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive
$805 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of September 13 through September 19,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive
$805 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of September 20 through September 26,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive
$805 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of September 27 through October 3,2009, the Claimant has been found to receive $805
in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
(

For the benefit week of November 22 through November 28,2009 the Claimant has been found to receive
$831 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of November 29 through December 5, 2009 the Claimant has been found to receive
$831 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
For the benefit week of December 6 through December 12, 2009 the Claimant has been found to receive
$831 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.

(

<

For the benefit week of December 13 through December 19, 2009 the Claimant has been found to receive
$831 in commission sales attributable to that week. As this amount was in excess of the Claimant's weekly
benefit amount, she was not entitled to the $469 in benefits issued that week.
The Utah Employment Security Act requires that a Claimant's weekly benefit be reduced in the amount by
which her earnings for the week exceed 30 percent of her weekly benefit amount. In order to administer this
provision of the Act, the Department requires all unemployment insurance Claimants to report their work
and earnings on their weekly claims. Any Claimant who willfully makes a false statement, or knowingly
fails to report a material fact to obtain benefits, is subject to the Act's administrative penalty for fraud, which
requires that benefits be denied for each week in which the misrepresentation occurred or fact withheld, for
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13 additional weeks for the first week of misrepresentation and 6 additional weeks for each week of
misrepresentation thereafter. The additional weeks of disqualification will not exceed 49 weeks. The
Claimant JS also required to repay the overpayment and, as a penalty, an amount equal to the overpayment.
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(5) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-406-40L

Claimant Fraud.

(2)
The Department relies primarily on information provided by the claimant when
paying unemployment insurance benefits. Fraud penalties do not apply if the overpayment
was the result of an inadvertent error. Fraud requires a willful misrepresentation or
concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits.
(3)
The absence of an admission or direct proof of intent to defraud does not prevent
a finding of fraud.
R994-406-401.

Claimant Fraud.

(1)
All three elements of fraud must be proved to establish an intentional
misrepresentation sufficient to constitute fraud. See section 35A-4-405(5). The three
elements are:
(a)

Materiality.

(i)
Materiality is established when a claimant makes false statements or fails to
provide accurate information for the purpose of obtaining;
(A)

any benefit payment to which the claimant is not entitled, or

(B)
waiting week credit which results in a benefit payment to which the claimant is
not entitled.
(ii)
A benefit payment received by fraud may include an amount as small as one
dollar over the amount a claimant was entitled to receive.
(b)

Knowledge.

A claimant must have known or should have known the information submitted to the
Department was incorrect or that he or she failed to provide information required by the
Department. The claimant does NOT have to know that the information will result in a
denial of benefits or a reduction of the benefit amount. Knowledge can also be established
when a claimant recklessly makes representations knowing he or she has insufficient
information upon which to base such representations, A claimant has an obligation to read
material provided by the Department or to ask a Department representative when he or she
has a question about what information to report.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r

Ferrie Daybe]]
(c)

-12-

10-A-13318-R

Willfulness.

Willfulness is established when a claimant files claims or other documents containing
false statements, responses or deliberate omissions.
The fraud element of materiality is established for the benefit weeks of March 8 through April 11, 2010,
April 19, 2010, to June 13, 2009; August 9 through October 3, 2009; and November 22 through
December 19, 2009. The Claimant received unemployment insurance benefits she was not entitled to
receive based on her failure to provide accurate information when submitting information to the Department
on March 9,2009, and September 15,2009, about her self-employment status. The Claimant testified at the
hearing she worked each of these weeks five to ten hours in her occupation of a mortgage loan officer trying
to develop work and working on loans that were finalized and commission paid to the Claimant based on
that work.
The Claimant was required to answer questions about her self-employment status which she did on March 9,
2009, and again on September 15, 2009. On March 9, 2009, the claimant answered "no" to the following
question: "Can you work full-time in this [self-employment]?" When asked to explain, she wrote:
1 am self employed and 1 am only paid when I close a loan and after my business expenses
have been covered. The loan industry started to collapse at the end of 2007, that is why 1
went to work for Convergys Corp in October of 2007. I haven't made any money since end
[sic] of 2007. I keep my license so I can do a loan for people if the new construction
business picks back up. There are very few new home purchases happening right now. I
haven't been able to do loans for anyone purchasing a new home since 2007 because of
stricter guideless [sic] required for borrowers: ie. required down payments, higher credit.
She answered "yes" to the question: "Is this work Seasonal?" Then she was asked: "If Yes, What do you do
for work in the offseason?" The Claimant wrote:
fry to find people that need to refinance or purchase a new home and need a loan. When I
knew the lending industry was collapsing 1 went and got a job at Convergys Corporation,
where I had worked previously from 1985-1997, I keep my license in effect ($12.00 per
year) in case the industry picks back up, 1 can make money again doing loans like 1 did in
2005 and 2006.
Based on these answers, the Department told the Claimant she did not need to report her work from her
corporation. A careful reading of the Claimant's above statements shows that she was not entirely forthright
with the Department. While it is true the Claimant only received commissions totaling $7,456 in 2008, she
received commissions totally $7,209.25 in basically the first two months of 2009, from January 1, 2009,
through March 6,2009. When the Claimant said she had not "been able to do loans for anyone purchasing
a new home since 2007" that might have technically been correct if all the commissions she received in 2008
and early 2009 were for refinanced homes. The statement was either purposefully misleading by omitting
the refinanced loans or incorrect.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Terrie Daybell

-13:

10-A-13318-R

This is especially true in light of the answers the Claimant provided on the same form on September 15,
2009. Again the Claimant answered "no" to the question: "Can you work full-time in this [selfemployment]?" In the explanation portion after that answer the Claimant wrote:
The market has forced lenders to tighten all requirements to obtain a mortgage loan. Unless
I can find someone who qualifies and is in the market to buy a new home, 1 have no business
and make no money....
This inaccurate information led the Department to tell the Claimant she did not need to report that she
worked. Had the Department known at the time the Claimant had earned commissions totaling $7,209.25
in the two plus months prior to answering those questions in March, or that she was paid commissions
totaling $14,816.74 in the six months between March 9, 2009, and September 15, 2009, the Department
wouid not have lold the Claimant she did not need to report her work.
The fraud element of knowledge is established in this case for the benefit weeks of March 8 through
April 11,2010; April 19,2010, through June 13,2009; August 9 through October 3,2009; and November 22
through December 19, 2009. While the Claimant testified she did not know she had to report time spent
each week in trying to obtain sales and working on loans that were finalized for commission to be issued,
she was issued a Claimant Guide that clearly outlined time spent in commission sales needed to be reported
to the Department. The Claimant offers that she reported to the Department her involvement of conducting
a business and was told since there were no proceeds or earnings associated with that work she would be
fine for the receipt of unemployment benefits. This information provided to the Claimant by the Department
was based on the Claimant's misleading or incorrect answers on the Self-employment forms of March 9,
2009, and September 15, 2009. The Claimant was never specifically told she did not have to report time
spent working each week when submitting weekly claims. The Claimant came to her conclusion based on
being told she could potentially qualify for benefits if she was not found to be working full-time as a
mortgage loan officer and/or not netting income from that work. The Claimant decided that this meant she
did not have to report working unless it was work done as an employee for a wage.
While it is understandable that the Claimant had not been ruled to be an employee of Key West Funding at
the time, that does not negate her responsibility to answer the questions on the Self-employment form
correctly. Since the Claimant did not answer these questions accurately it is found the Claimant's misleading
statements or omissions amount to fraud.
The fraud element of willfulness is established in this case for the benefit period of March 8 through
April 11,2010; April 19,2010ahroughJune 13,2009; August 9 through October 3,2009; and November 22
through December 19,2009. The Utah Supreme Court in Mineer v. Board of Review, 572 P.2d 1364 (Utah
1977), commented:
The intention to defraud is shown by the claims themselves which contain false statements
and fail to set forth material facts required by statute. The filing of such claims evidences
a purpose or willingness to present a false claim in order to obtain unlawful benefits and
hence are manifestations of intent to defraud. Id At 1366.
While the Claimant states she never purposely provided false information in order to receive benefits she
was not entitled to receive, she did submit statements that were false concerning her work status.
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Furthermore, the Claimant failed to set forth material facts regarding the commissions she was receiving.
When she filed for an extension of benefits in September 2009, she indicated it had been several months
since she had received commission, when in fact she received several commission checks in April, May, and
June, as well as one in August 2009 just before she filed for the extension of benefits.
As the fraud elements of materiality, knowledge, and control have been established in this case, it is found
the Claimant's actions constitute fraud as defined in the Utah Employment Security Act. Therefore, a fraud
overpayment in the amount of $10,535 must be established, as well as a civil penalty which is required to
equal the amount of the fraud overpayment, $10,535. Furthennore, the Claimant is disqualified from the
receipt of benefits for 49 additional weeks beginning March 28, 2010, through March 5, 2011.
DECISION AND ORDER:
The decision from the Workforce Appeals Board that denied unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks
ending April 4; May 16; May 30; June 13; September 5; October 3; and December 19,2009, on the grounds
the Claimant failed to accurately report her work and earnings and, therefore, knowingly withheld material
information in order to receive benefits to which she was not entitled is affirmed but modified to the period
of March 8 through April 1 K 2010; April 19, 2010, through June 13,2009; August 9 through October 3,
2009; and November 22 through December 19, 2009. The decision that the Claimant was further
disqualified for 49 weeks, beginning March 28, 2010, and ending May 5, 2011 is affirmed. The decision
the Claimant has a fraud overpayment of to $2,928, and a civil penalty of $2,928, is affirmed but modified
to a fraud overpayment of$ 10,535 and a civil penalty of $ 10,53 5 for a total overpayment of $21,070 which
the Claimant must repay to the Department, pursuant to Section 35A-4-406(4) of the Utah Employment
Security Act.
If the Claimant is unable to repay the total amount immediately, she should contact the Collections
Department at 801-526-9235 or write to PO Box 45288, Salt Lake City, UT 841454)288.

'John DcwenpqK
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued:

September 29,2010

JD/11/cdr
cc:

BLAIN H JOHNSON
JOHNSON LAW FIRM
2036 LINCOLN AVE STE 02
OGDENUT 84401
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These contentions lack merit in:
(1) That appellant intended to defraud is shown by his claim for unemployment
compensation . . . to which he was not entitled, as established by the undisputed
testimony of his employer, Julius Oberg.
(2) That an actual fraud was committed is proven by the payment of appellant's false
claim . . . .
(3) That false pretenses were used to perpetrate the fraud was established by proving
the making of the false claim.
(4) That the false pretenses were the cause which induced the owner (the State of
Idaho) to part with its property ($14.00), was proven by the warrant of the State
Auditor issued to appellant in payment of the precise amount of unemployment
compensation falsely claimed by appellant and for the week ending 1-30-39, as
likewise falsely claimed by him; and
(5) That the money so paid out was the property of the State of Idaho was proven by
the warrant drawn upon the Treasurer of the Stale of Idaho by the State Auditor.
[#arr at p 287]
The knowledge element was clearly present in this case, as was found by the Administrative Law
Judge. In a very similar case, Tillett v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2004 UTApp 323 (Utah Ct. App.
2004) the claimant alleged he had been misled by the Department when he filed for unemployment
benefits. Tillett filed a claim for unemployment benefits v/hen he was separated from one of his jobs
but he continued to work part-time at another job. Tillett told the Department claims taker when he
filed that he continued to be employed at his part-time job and was told that he could still file a claim
for benefits. The claimant interpreted that to mean that he did not have to report the work and
earnings from his second employer. The Court of Appeals analyzed that argument as going to the
knowledge prong of the fraud test, not the willfulness prong, and found that:
the relevant information contained in the Claimant Guide demonstrate^] that Tillett
f
knfew| or should have known the information submitted to the Department was
incorrect or that he failed to provide information required by the Department.'
The Claimant knew, or should have known, that she needed to report her commission work and
earnings and that by telling the Department that she had not done any "new home" loans since 2007
and that unless she can find someone who qualifies for a new home loan she has "no business," was
misleading. The knowledge prong was met.
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The Claimant admits that she failed to report she prepared the misleading statements and that she
did not report her work and earnings. The willfulness element has been shown. The
misrepresentations and/or omissions were material. All three elements of the fraud test have been
shown.
The Claimant complains on appeal that she has received several different notices from the
Department concerning her overpayment. This may be because of the different decisions reached
on this case. The correct overpayment is contained in the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
and is adopted by the Board. If the Claimant receives a notice for a different amount she should
contact the Department for clarification.
The Claimant was an employee of Key West and the commissions she earned should have been
reported and counted as determined by the Administrative Law Judge. The Claimant's
misrepresentations to the Department about her income from Key West was misleading and led to
the misinformation provided by the Department. Had the Claimant informed the Department of her
income from Key West, she would not have been told she did not need to report her work and
earnings. All three elements of the fraud test were proven. The reasoning and conclusions of law
of the Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying benefits for the weeks ending March 8
through April 11, 2009; April 19 through June 13, 2009; August 9 through October 3, 2009; and
November 22 through December 19,2009; and disqualifying the Claimant for 49 additional weeks
beginning March 28,2010, and ending March 5,2011, under the provisions of §35 A-4-405(5) of the
Utah Employment Security Act, is affirmed.
The overpayment and penalty of $21,070 established by the Department pursuant to §§35 A-4-405(5)
and 35A-4-406(4) remain in effect.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed
to each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be
considered to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
The filing of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this
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order. If a request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another
decision. 'This decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time
limitation for such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Sail Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah
Employment Security Act; §63-46b-l 6 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as
required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD

Date Issued: November 18, 2010
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 18th day of November, 2010, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
TERRIE DAYBELL
2757 W 2100 N
CLINTON UT 84015-7693
BLAIN H JOHNSON
JOHNSON LAW FIRM
2036 LINCOLN AVE STE 102
OGDENUT 84401
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

THRRIE DAYBELL, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-0327

Case No. 10-B-01347
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
The fraud overpayment of $21,070 remains in effect.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated September 29, 2010, Case No. 10-A-13318-R, the Administrative Law Judge
affirmed but modified the Department decision holding the Claimant knowingly withheld material
information from the Department regarding her work and earnings during the weeks ending April 4,
May 16, May 30, June 13, September 5, October 3, and December 19, 2009, in order to obtain
benefits to which she was not entitled. The Administrative Law Judge modified the weeks of
disqualification to March 8 through April 11, 2009; April 19 through June 13, 2009; August 9
through October 3, 2009; and November 22 through December 19, 2009. The Administrative Law
J udge's decision, therefore, denied benefits for those weeks plus 49 additional weeks from March 28,
2010. until March 5, 2011, and required the Claimant to repay $21,070 to the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Fund.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: October 13, 2010.
ISSUES BEFORE THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Claimant knowingly withhold material information in order to obtain benefits to
which she was not entitled pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(5)?
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Was the overpayment correctly established pursuant to the provisions of § §3 5 A-4-405 (5) and
35A-4-406(4)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant obtained her mortgage lending license in September of 2003 and started working as
a loan officer through Key West Funding. Key West told her when she started that she was
considered to be an independent contractor, even though she could not do any mortgage lending
work for any other entity. Key West reported the Claimant's commissions via a form 1099. The
Claimant was advised by her accountant to establish a Subchapter S corporation, Daybell Financial,
for her mortgage lending income. The Claimant was responsible for finding all of her own
customers and was paid on a commission. She worked from her home.
In 2006 the Daybell Financial had commission income of $33,258, in 2007 the income was $28,123.
In 2008 the income was $7,456 and in 2009 the income was $28,575. The Claimant also worked
for Convergys CMC Inc. from October 15, 2007, through January 15, 2009. She was laid off from
Convergys for reasons that were not disqualifying and filed for unemployment benefits on March 9,
2010. When she filed her claim, the Claimant completed a form about her self-employment which
asked: "Can you work full time in this [self employment]?" The Claimant responded "no" to that
question. When asked to explain her answer she wrote:
I am self employed and I am only paid when I close a loan and after my business
expenses have been covered. The loan industry started to collapse at the end of 2007,
that is why I went to work for Convergys Corp in October of 2007. I haven't made
any money since end [sic] of 2007. I keep my license so I can do a loan for people
if the new construction business picks back up. There are very few new home
purchases happening right now. I haven't been able to do loans for anyone
purchasing a new home since 2007 because of stricter guideless [sic] required for
borrowers: ie. required down payments, higher credit
She answered "yes" to the question: "Is this work Seasonal?" Then she was asked: "If Yes, What
do you do for work in the offseason?" The Claimant wrote:
try to find people that need to refinance or purchase a new home and need a loan.
When I knew the lending industry was collapsing I went and got a job at Convergys
Corporation, where I had worked previously from 1985-1997. I keep my license in
effect ($12.00 per year) in case the industry picks back up, I can make money again
doine; loans like I did in 2005 and 2006.
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Based on these answers, the Department told the Claimant she did not need to report her work from
her corporation. A careful reading of the Claimant's above statements show that she was not
forthright with the Department. While it is true the Claimant only received commissions totaling
$7,456 in 2008, she received commissions totally $7,209.25 from January 1,2009, through March 9,
2009, when she filed her claim. When the Claimant said she had not "been able to do loans for
anyone purchasing a new home since 2007" that statement might have been technically correct, if
all the commissions she received in 2008 and early 2009 were for refinanced homes. The statement
was, however, misleading in that it failed to mention the income the Claimant received from people
who refinanced their homes.
The Claimant argues on appeal to the Board that when she provided those answers she completely
filled up the space available on the computer for that answer. She argues that had there been more
space, she would have explained that she made $7,209 in commissions during the first two plus
mouths of 2009. The Claimant also argues on appeal that she also talked to Department
representatives and explained the difference between new loans and refinancing and that she could
not take any money out of Daybell Financial and hence was not making any money.
The Claimant also alleges, as she did during the hearing, that her accountant advised her to leave all
the commission earnings in her S corporation until the end of the calendar year and to then take out
only the net income she made. The Claimant alleges, and her income tax returns reflect, that while
her income for 2009 was $28,575, her second highest year ever, her net income from the corporation
was only $3,368.
On September 15,2010, the Claimant filed an application for an extension of unemployment benefits
under the emergency unemployment benefits provisions passed by Congress. The Claimant was
again asked to answer questions regarding her self-employment. Again the Claimant answered "no"
to the question: "Can you work full-time in this [self-employment]?" In the explanation portion after
that answer the Claimant wrote:
The market has forced lenders to tighten all requirements to obtain a mortgage loan.
IJ nlcss I can find someone who qualifies and is in the market to buy a new home,
I have no business and make no money. . . . [emphasis supplied]
Again the Department told the Claimant she did not need to report her work for Key West based on
the answers she provided. If the Department had known that the Claimant had income of
514,816.74 in the six months between March 9, 2009, and September 15, 2009, the Department
would not have told the Claimant she did not need to report her work.
In 2009 the Department conducted an audit of Key West covering all of 2008 and the first two
quarters of 2009. The audit determined that Key West's loan origination officers are employees
subject to unemployment taxes. The Claimant's work record with Key West was reviewed during
the audit and based on the audit results, Key West started reporting her commissions as wages.
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Those commissions/wages were used in detemiining the Claimant's base period earnings when
determining her weekly benefit amount. The audit results were not appealed by Key West nor did
the Claimant object to the gross income received from her commissions being counted as wages for
the purposes of detennining her higher benefit level.
Under most circumstances, the Department considers mortgage loan originators and loan officers
to be employees working in covered employment. This is because Utah Code specifies that they arc
required to be licensed and may only work on behalf of one entity at a time. Additionally, the
principal lending manager must exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of the mortgage
loan originators. Additionally, the mortgage loan originator is required to be sponsored by a
licensed entity and be affiliated with a principal lending manager. The mortgage loan officer's
license automatically becomes inactive the same day they are not sponsored by an entity or the
license of the entity becomes inactive. It also becomes inactive if they are no longer affiliated with
a principal lending manager or the license of the principal lending manager becomes inactive. The
Claimant was sponsored by Key West throughout the period she was receiving unemployment
benefits.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires that all FH A
loans be conducted under the direct supervision and control of an FHA-approved mortgagee and
must demonstrate the essential characteristics of the employer/employee relationship. HUD also
requires that all compensation paid to loan officers of FHA-approved loans be reported on a Form
W-2, and be subject to Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). State unemployment law covers
essentially any service covered by FUTA. The Claimant admitted during the hearing that she did
some FHA-approved loans. Because some of her employment is subject to PUT A, the Department
considers all of her employment with that entity to be covered employment. During the time the
Claimant was claiming unemployment benefits she was an employee of Key West. As an employee
she is not entitled to deduct the expenses she deducted for income tax purposes.
The Claimant argues on appeal that the Administrative Law Judge exceeded the authority granted
to him in the remand order of August 26, 2010. That order said that the case was remanded to a
different Administrative Law Judge "to hold a new hearing, take additional testimony, and admit
additional documents." While it is true much of the rest of the remand order discussed the need for
the Claimant to provide proof of her expenses, the Board does not believe the Administrative Law
Judge exceeded his authority and adopts his findings of fact and reasoning. The first time this case
was before the Board, the Board did not have, or did not consider, evidence that Key West was
reporting the commissions paid to the Claimant as wages. When the Administrative Law Judge
noticed that on remand, it changed the nature of the case and the way it should be analyzed. The
Board has reviewed the entire record in this matter and finds that Administrative Law Judge acted
within his authority and correctly in this matter.
Even if the Board were to find the Administrative Law Judge exceeded his authority, the remedy
would be to remand the case to him again with instructions to consider all the evidence and reach
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a decision. The Board is confident that the result would be the same and another remand would only
result in an unnecessary delay in this matter. Additionally, since the Board is the ultimate finder of
fact in an unemployment case, by adopting the findings of fact and reasoning and conclusions of law
of the Administrative Law Judge, the Board has cured any defect in the remand. Finally, the
Claimant does not argue that she was not an employee of Key West or that there is any additional
evidence she would have presented if the remand decision had been different. The Administrative
Law Judge did not err by going "beyond" the remand decision.
The Claimant next argues on appeal that she did not commit fraud because she was following the
advice given to her by Department representatives when she filed her claim. The advice was given,
undoubtedly, because the Claimant provided incorrect or incomplete information to the Department.
The Claimant argues that the space on the computer was not big enough for her to give a full
explanation, if that were true, the Claimant should have contacted the Department and reported that
she needed to provide additional information. The Board does not find it credible that a Department
employee would tell the Claimant she did not have to report her income from Key West if that
Department employee had known how much money the Claimant made from Key West.
The Claimant argues that by having her commissions from Key West paid to Daybell Financial and
then not paying herself until the end of the year she did not commit fraud. The Board is not
convinced. Under the Claimant's theory, what would there be to stop any employee from doing the
same thing? Any employee could just establish a Subchapter S corporation, put all of his or her
earnings into that corporation, and write off expenses "reasonably related" to work and only pay
himself or herself one payment at the end of the year.
Prior to filing her claim for benefits the Claimant was sent the Claimant Guide. The Claimant Guide
slates, in part:

Work and Earnings Reporting
You must report all of your work and earnings for the week in which you worked,
even if you have not been paid. While claiming benefits it is your obligation to
accurately report your gross earnings before taxes and other deductions.
You must report:
Full-time or part-time work.
Work on contract or commission basis.
You are responsible for any inaccurate or incomplete information you provide.
If you receive more income than you reported, it is your obligation to
immediately contact the Claims Center to correct previously reported earnings.
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Failure to correctly report all work and earnings, including part time or
temporary work, could result in overpayments and penalties. (See Fraud.)
If you have questions about reporting work and earnings, contact the Claims
Center, [emphasis in original]
The Guide is clear in stating work has to be reported at the time the work is done, not when payment
is received. Maybe the way the Claimant paid herself from Daybell Financial was the correct thing
to do for tax purposes; however, she should not have relied on that method when reporting to the
Department for unemployment benefits.
Even if it were determined the Claimant was self-employed, and not an employee, throughout this
period the Board would go back to the Department's original decision given the Claimant's testimony
during the second hearing. While the Claimant alleged she only worked four to five hours per week,
her testimony in that regard was self-serving and is not supported by the weight of the evidence
presented in this matter. The Claimant testified she was thinking about her "business" 24 hours a
day. She also incurred expenses that are not consistent with working only four to five hours per
week. She paid, for instance, about $700 per month to "independent contractors," most of whom
appear to be her children. This money went to cleaning her office, shoveling the snow at her home,
and passing out leaflets and business cards. That monthly amount is nearly three times what the
Claimant says she earned from Daybell Financial. If the Claimant was only working four to live
hours per week, she could have kept that $700 monthly amount and done those chores hersel f Some
of her other claimed expenses were also questionable. Unemployment is not intended to support a
claimant while he or she establishes a business. It appears, from the Claimant's alleged expenses,
that were we to find she was self-employed, the unemployment benefits were being used for just that
purpose.
Department rules provide:
R994-406-401.

Claimant Fraud.

(1)
All three elements of fraud must be proved to establish an intentional
misrepresentation sufficient to constitute fraud. See section 35 A-4-405(5). The three
elements are:
(a)

Materiality.

(i)
Materiality is established when a claimant makes false statements or
fails to provide accurate information for the purpose of obtaining;
(A)

any benefit payment to which the claimant is not entitled, or
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(B)
waiting week credit which results in a benefit payment to which the
claimant is not entitled.
(ii)
A benefit payment received by fraud may include an amount as small
as om dollar over the amount a claimant was entitled to receive.
(b)

Knowledge.

A claimant must have known or should have known the information
submitted to the Department was incorrect or that he or she failed to provide
information required by the Department. The claimant does NOT have to know that
the information will result in a denial of benefits or a reduction of the benefit amount.
Knowledge can also be established when a claimant recklessly makes representations
knowing he or she has insufficient information upon which to base such
representations. A claimant has an obligation to read material provided by the
Department or to ask a Department representative when he or she has a
question about what information to report.
(c)

Willfulness.

Willfulness is established when a claimant files claims or other
documents containing false statements, responses or deliberate omissions. If a
claimant delegates the responsibility to personally provide information or allows
access to his or her Personal Identification Number (PIN) so that someone else may
file a claim, the claimant is responsible for the information provided or omitted by
the other person, even if the claimant had no advance knowledge that the information
provided was false or important information was omitted.
(2)
The Department relies primarily on information provided by the
claimant when paying unemployment insurance benefits. Fraud penalties do not
apply if the overpayment was the result of an inadvertent error. Fraud requires a
will ful misrepresentation or concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining
unemployment benefits.
(3)
The absence of an admission or direct proof of intent to defraud does
not prevent a finding of fraud, [emphasis supplied]
The Utah statute provides that fraud is found:
35A-4-405(5) (a) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made
a false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an additional 13 weeks
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for the first week the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six
weeks for each week thereafter; the additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks.
In Mineer v. Board of Review», Utah, 572 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1977) the Utah Supreme Court
consolidated two cases with similar facts. Mineer worked a total of 12 or 13 hours during the week
ending October 5, 1974, but failed to report the work when she filed her weekly claim. Her weekly
benefit amount was $57 per week. She testified that she did not report the work because she
believed she was in training and was not certain she would be paid. Three of four weeks after she
performed the work, the employer paid her $26.28 for the week ending October 5. The law in effect
at the time provided for a 52-week disqualification period to begin at the time of the false statement.
Hence, even though Mineer did not work after October 5, all weeks after that week were in the 52
week disqualification period and subject to the overpayment and penalty provisions of the act. The
claimant was ordered to repay $1,640. The facts involving the other claimant in the Mineer case
were similar. The court held:
Plaintiffs' contention that the evidence fails to support a finding of fraud is without
merit. The intention to defraud is shown by the claims themselves which contain
false statements and fail to set forth material facts required by statute. The filing of
such claims evidences a purpose or willingness to present a false claim in order to
obtain unlawful benefits and hence are manifestations of intent to defraud.
In so holding, the court in Mineer cited State v Ban 63 Idaho 59; 117 P.2d 282 (Idaho 1941) which
was a criminal proceeding involving unemployment fraud. The claimant filed a weekly claim for
benefits stating that he worked for Julius Oberg and earned $6 that week. The claimant received a
partial unemployment payment of $14 for the week. Mr. Oberg was contacted and testified that the
claimant earned $17.25 working for him during the week in question, not $6.
. . . to constitute the offense of obtaining money under false pretenses, four things
"must be proved: (1) there must be an intent to defraud; (2) there must be an actual
fraud committed; (3) false pretenses must be used for the purpose of perpetrating the
fraud; and (4) the fraud must be accomplished by means of the false pretenses made
use of for the purpose, viz., they must be the cause which induced the owner to part
with his property."
It will be conceded if there is a failure of proof in any one of these particulars, the
judgment of conviction against appellant must be reversed. . . .

It is . . . contended (1) "there was no proof whatever of an intent to defraud"; (2)
"there is absolutely no proof whatever of an actual fraud committed," and (3) that
"there is no evidence in any way indicating the ownership of this property or money."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Form BRDEC

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD

Issue 10

Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

TERRIE DAYBELL, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-0327

:
Case No. 10-R-01623
RECONSIDERATION

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In facsimile received December 9, 2010, Claimant's Representative, Blain H. Johnson, requested
reconsideration of the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on November 18,
2010. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board was based on a review of a decision of an
Administrative Law Judge after a formal hearing.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-13(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within
the meaning and intent of that section of law.
DECISION:
The Claimant Representative's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce
Appeals Board dated November 18, 2010, remains in effect.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
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of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 22nd day of December, 2010, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
TERRIE DAYBELL
2757 W 2100 N
CLINTON UT 84015-7693
BLAIN H. JOHNSON
JOHNSON LAW FIRM
2036 LINCOLN AVE STE 102
OGDENUT 84401
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